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The enforcement of competition law in the EU is at
historic heights, with numerous cases and high-profile
decisions which made it, without any doubt, the “star” of
EU law. Due to its perceived success, EU competition
law and enforcement became a model followed by an
increasing number of emerging and developing economies
outside the Union itself—a “beacon” for the enforcement
of competition rules across the world.
Such an enviable position does not preclude but, on
the contrary, warrants more scrutiny of the way the EU
competition law is enforced. Is the EU system fully
compliant with the requirements of due process, what is
the quality of the decisions, and how prone is this system
to errors—all these are valid and more meaningful
questions than ever.
This article aims to sketch out an analysis of the way
the EU competition law is enforced, and I intend to delve
into this analysis in future contributions. For the time
being, this endeavour is limited to outlining certain
aspects of the enforcement of the EU competition rules
that have been and are raising concerns. Thus, I shall
focus this preliminary analysis on cartels, as perhaps the
most important part of the competition law, in terms of
number of cases and effects on consumer welfare.
I consider that this is the appropriate moment to discuss
flaws and their possible fixes, given that the European
Commission is approaching the end of the legislative
process1 for a new directive aimed at switching the
enforcement of the EU competition law into a higher gear,
through the empowering of the national competition
authorities with the right tools in order to achieve a fully
effective enforcement of these rules (“a genuine common
competition enforcement area”, in the words of the
Commission), a process dubbed as ECN+.Whilst I mostly
agree with the contemplated changes, I am of the opinion
that they do not cover the main concerns raised with
regard to the EU competition enforcement.
There are early claims in various forums for a reform
of the enforcement structure which was established in
1962.2 Even if the EU competition enforcement structure
proved to bemostly effective over time, due to a changing
landscape of both the economy, where new challenges
arose, especially in the digital economy, and of the legal
background, where the fundamental rights have come to
prominence in the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights and of the European Court of Justice, the
reform thereof appears to be worth considering at this
point.
I argue in this article that the need for a reform of the
EU competition enforcement became stringent, even if
it does not necessarily entail major structural changes,
which are more difficult to implement. I am pragmatic
and I advocate for, at least, a more careful analysis of the
factual circumstances in order to avoid the per-se
trap—using the by-object box too frequently and
considering too easily that such an infringement exists,
based on only a slim layer of facts.
The prohibition of cartels
The founders of the European Communities instated from
the very beginning an outright prohibition of agreements
and concerted practices which would have the object or
the effect of distorting the competition on the then nascent
common market of the European Communities, the
current internal market of the EU. Notwithstanding the
rationale and the objective pursued through such a
prohibition, from protection of the free market, to
enhancing consumer welfare or achieving a fully
operational common market, the impact of the legal
provision embedded in the current art. 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) is
unquestionable:
“1. The following shall be prohibited as
incompatible with the internal market: all
agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and which
have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition
within the internal market, and in particular
those which: (a) directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions; (b) limit or control
production, markets, technical
development, or investment; (c) share
markets or sources of supply; (d) apply
dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive
*Many thanks to my colleague Magdalena Popescu for her valuable contributions to this article.
1 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/nca.html [Accessed 5 October 2018].
2See Ian S. Forrester, “Due process in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 817–843; Frank Montag, “The Case for
a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17” (1996) 8 E.C.L.R. 428, 430; Donald Slater, Sebastien Thomas and Denis Waelbroeck: Competition
Law Proceedings before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?, The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series GCLC
Working Paper 04/08.
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disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject
of such contracts.”
However, as noted in the doctrine,3 the same legal norm
providing the prohibition left some leeway for the
undertakings, by allowing them to demonstrate that the
benefits of their apparently negative actions outweighed
the potential harm to competition—art.101, para.3 TFEU.
Meeting all the positive and negative conditions
provided by art.101, para.3 TFEU is a very difficult
endeavour, making it a truly “probatio diabolica” but,
however, it is not an impossible process and, although
very rarely, these conditions were met. The mere
existence of the exoneration conditions and their
persistence over time, without being challenged on
reasons such as lack of practical usefulness, flags an
important principle—that the authors of the treaties did
not intend for the prohibition to be absolute and the
by-object presumption to be irrebuttable, even in case of
what has been later considered in the case law of ECJ as
“hard core”: price fixing, market sharing and limitation
of production. This means that art.101, para.1 may never
be applied in an indiscriminate manner and by
disregarding the case-by-case realities and circumstances
and that due care must be taken to perform a thorough
enough analysis of each behaviour prior to reaching the
conclusion that it “may affect trade”.
The simple things
The main issue with the enforcement of art.101 TFEU is
probationary, meaning that whenever an infringement
occurs, its existence and harmfulness must be proved
beyond any reasonable doubt in every and each individual
case. This is a basic principle of liability in any legal
system in the world and it requires the accusation to
support the charges with evidence that the specific details
of the case amount to an infringement of the prohibition
of cartels.
The burden of proof for a competition infringement
lies in the first place with the competition enforcement
agency—the undertaking is presumed innocent and the
competition authority suspecting the opposite must gather
sufficient evidence proving the infringement beyond
reasonable doubt. The enforcer should seek to avoid any
confirmation bias in the process of investigation—the
subjectivity and the tendency to rather come to the
conclusions that guilt exists, given the considerable
amount of agency resources and time spent in an
investigation. The confirmation bias is often present in
the activity of the competition enforcers and is one of the
most negative elements of the activity of a competition
agency, which should be vigorously fought.
The concept of by-object (per-se) infringement
originates outside the competition law, in the criminal
law, and is due to a pragmatic need to punish behaviours
which are clearly harmful, at the lowest possible cost and
in the shortest time, based on the precedents. Wherever
in past cases a certain behaviour resulted in negative
consequences, it is justified that its occurrence in any
other situation in the future will be considered equally
negative and punished as if the actual harm had occurred.
The rationale behind this concept is to enhance deterrence,
especially since most cartels produce major harm to
consumers and are also difficult to detect, given the secret
way they operate. There is an imbalance between the
larger number of potential cartels in the economy and the
possibility to detect and sanction them, which justifies
the existence of a tool which can facilitate the work of
the competition agencies.
Eventually, all the infringements of the cartels’
prohibition are based on harm to the market and the
consumers and the only difference is that in case of
by-object breaches, the harm may be only potential and
does not have to be demonstrated, whilst for by-effects
violations, the full process for demonstrating the harm
and the casual link with the wrongdoingmust be followed.
The “per-se” infringement is based on a (“induction
based”4) presumption that the wrongdoing exists, provided
that a minimal set of facts were identified, without the
need to proceed into a throughout analysis of the case or
to prove the actual consequences. However, the existence
of rules of thumb, which incorporate the previous
experiences and the economic rationale that certain
behaviours will most likely result in anti-competitive
consequences, does not exempt the investigators from
making any analysis of the specific facts and their
circumstances. There is often a thin line between a
behaviour which can certainly distort competition and a
benign behaviour, and this imposes a duty on the
competition agencies to carefully weight all the elements
and resist the temptation to call the shots too soon.
As difficult as it is for this presumption to be rebutted,
it cannot go counter to the basic presumption of innocence
and it does not exclude the obligation for the competition
agency to provide sufficient evidence of the wrongdoing.
If the presumption that the infringement exists in cases
of by-object deeds would be a floor on which a
competition agency may base its accusation, the
presumption of innocencewould be ceiling, which always
needs to be supported on sufficiently strong pillars. The
per-se concept allows competition agencies to jump to
conclusions but it does not change the nature of the
infringement, nor does it allow enforcers to be complacent
and avoid the need to sit on a minimum layer of facts and
specific analysis before making the jump.
To conclude, the use of the per-se infringements is
justified by the pragmatic need to facilitate the sanctioning
of the wrongdoers, building on experience and sound
3 See, for instance, Okeoghene Odudu, “The boundaries of EC Competition Law. The Scope of Article 81” [2012] Oxford Scholarship Online 128–159.
4O. Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law The Scope of Article 81 (Oxford: OUP, 2006), p.114.
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economic analysis. This advantage comes with the risk
that the competition agencies might become complacent
and might see per-se infringements of the cartel
prohibition all around, even where the infringement could
be by effect or could not exist at all.
The signals from the EU courts
The European Court of Justice has started, as early as the
2000s, to clearly signal that by-object infringements
should not be treated superficially and that the
presumption of innocence remains applicable, so that due
care must be given to evidence of the wrongdoing and of
the potential to harm the competitive process and the
consumers:
“(60) Any doubt in the mind of the Court must
operate to the advantage of the undertaking
to which the decision finding an
infringement was addressed. The Court
cannot therefore conclude that the
Commission has established the
infringement at issue to the requisite legal
standard if it still entertains any doubts on
that point, in particular in proceedings for
annulment of a decision imposing a fine.”5
“(45) In that latter situation, it is necessary to take
account of the presumption of innocence,
as it results in particular from Article 6(2)
of the Convention for the Protection of
HumanRights and Fundamental Freedoms,
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 (‘the
ECHR’), which is one of the fundamental
rights which, according to the settled
case-law of the Court of Justice, also
reaffirmed in Article 6(2) EU, constitute
general principles of Community law.
Given the nature of the infringements in
question and the nature and degree of
severity of the ensuing penalties, the
principle of the presumption of innocence
applies, inter alia, to the procedures relating
to infringements of the competition rules
applicable to undertakings that may result
in the imposition of fines or periodic
penalty payments (see, to that effect, Case
C-199/92 PHüls v Commission [1999] ECR
I-4287, paragraphs 149 and 150, and Case
C-235/52 P Montecatini v Commission
[1999] ECR I-4539, paragraphs 175 and
176)”.6
“(72) According to the case-law, the Commission
must prove the infringements which it has
found and adduce evidence capable of
demonstrating to the requisite legal standard
the existence of the facts constituting an
infringement.”7
In 2011, the matter of the evidence in the competition
law has been tackled also by the European Court of
Human Rights inMenarini.8 This decision confirmed the
equivalence of the EU competition law with the criminal
law, due essentially to the severity of the penalties which
may be applied to the wrongdoers.
In Menarini, ECHR established that the equivalence
of the EU competition law with the criminal law should
go beyondmere acknowledgement, and into concrete and
enhanced rights for the undertakings and corresponding
obligations for the competition authorities to demonstrate
beyond any reasonable doubt that the infringement truly
existed, even in cases of “per-se” infringements of the
prohibition of the anti-competitive agreements and
concerted practices in the EU.
After the ECHR landmark decision in Menarini, the
ECJ continued to send evenmore vigorously the message
that the benefit of doubt prevails in competition law
matters, including in cases of alleged per-se
infringements:
“(72) Moreover, where the Court still has a doubt,
the benefit of that doubt must be given to
the undertakings accused of the
infringement (see, to that effect, Case 27/76
United Brands and United Brands
Continental v Commission [1978] ECR207,
paragraph 265). Indeed, the presumption
of innocence constitutes a general principle
of EuropeanUnion law, currently laid down
in Article 48(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.”9 [Emphasis added.]
“(38) In so far as the referring court has doubts
as to the possibility, in view of the
presumption of innocence, of finding that
the travel agencies were aware, or ought to
have been aware, of the message at issue
in the main proceedings, it must be recalled
that the presumption of innocence
constitutes a general principle of EU law,
now enshrined in Article 48(1) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (see, to that effect,
judgment in E.ON Energie v Commission,
C-89/11 P, EU:C:2012:738, paragraph 72),
which the Member States are required to
observe when they implement EU
competition law (see, to that effect,
judgments in VEBIC, C-439/08,
5Dresdner Bank AG and others v Commission of the European Communities (T-44/02P, T-54/02, T-56/02, T-60/02 & T-61/02) EU:T:2006:271.
6 Siemens AG v European Commission (T-110/07) EU:T:2011:68.
7Dresdner Bank EU:T:2006:271 at [59], and the case law cited.
8A. Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v Italy, application no. 43509/08.
9E.ON Energie AG v European Commission (C-89/11 P) EU:C:2012:738.
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EU:C:2010:739, paragraph 63, and N.,
C-604/12, EU:C:2014:302, paragraph
41).”10
Furthermore, after Menarini, the ECJ, in a landmark
decision in 2014, brought the level of demands to the next
level—there is a need to produce an analysis of the
behaviour on a case-by-case basis and, while proving
actual anti-competitive effects is not required for
by-object infringement, the capacity of the deed to
produce actual anti-competitive effects is a must. The
competition agencies should clearly explain the
harmfulness; this harmfulness must be determined and
not just presumed.
As tempting as it may be, the presumption of
anti-competitive by-object infringements can be applied
only in restrictively determined and carefully analysed
cases and only where there is no other possible
explanation for the facts in the case. All these require an
in concreto analysis of the facts, even if the actual effects
do not have to be analysed, nor proved.
The breakthrough decision in this respect is Cartes
Bancaires, where the ECJ found that:
“(53) According to the case-law of the Court, in
order to determine whether an agreement
between undertakings or a decision by an
association of undertakings reveals a
sufficient degree of harm to competition
that it may be considered a restriction of
competition ‘by object’ within the meaning
of Article 81(1) EC, regard must be had to
the content of its provisions, its objectives
and the economic and legal context of
which it forms a part. When determining
that context, it is also necessary to take into
consideration the nature of the goods or
services affected, as well as the real
conditions of the functioning and structure
of the market or markets in question (see,
to that effect, judgment in Allianz Hungária
Biztosító and Others (EU:C:2013:160),
paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
(58) Secondly, in the light of that case-law, the
General Court erred in finding (…) that the
concept of restriction of competition by
‘object’ must not be interpreted
‘restrictively’. The concept of restriction of
competition ‘by object’ can be applied only
to certain types of coordination between
undertakings which reveal a sufficient
degree of harm to competition that it may
be found that there is no need to examine
their effects, (…).
(86) Although the General Court found, in
paragraph 198 of the judgment under
appeal, that the measures at issue
encouraged the members of the Grouping
not to exceed a certain volume of CB card
issuing, the objective of such
encouragement was, according to its own
findings in paragraphs 245, 247 and 327 of
that judgment, not to reduce possible
overcapacity on the market for the issue of
payment cards in France, but to achieve a
given ratio between the issuing and
acquisition activities of the members of the
Grouping in order to develop the CB system
further.
(87) It follows that the General Court could not,
without erring in law, characterise the
measures at issue as restrictions of
competition ‘by object’ within the meaning
of Article 81(1) EC.
(88) Since the intentions of the Grouping could
not in themselves, in accordance with the
case-law referred to in paragraph 54 above,
be sufficient to establish the existence of
an anti-competitive object (…), cannot
justify such a characterisation and there is
no need to examine the arguments put
forward by the appellant on that point.”11
The same conclusions were restated in subsequent
decisions:
“(18) As regards the concept of restriction of
competition ‘by object’, the Court has held
that it must be interpreted restrictively and
can be applied only to certain types of
coordination between undertakings which
reveal a sufficient degree of harm to
competition that it may be found that there
is no need to examine their effects (see, to
that effect, judgment in CB v Commission,
C-67/13 P, EU:C:2014:2204, paragraph
58).”12
In the EU, it looks like the “per-se” concept seduced
also the investigators looking into potential abuses of
dominant cases, which, by their intrinsic nature and as it
appears from the wording of art.102 TFEU, should be
treated always as effects-based infringements. The
European Commission went on to say that there are
behaviours which
“were by their very nature capable of restricting
competition such that an analysis of all the
circumstances of the case and, in particular, an AEC
test were not necessary in order to find an abuse of
a dominant position”
10Eturas” UAB and others v Lietuvos Respublikos konkurencijos taryba (C-74/14) EU:C:2016:42.
11Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v European Commission (C-67/13 P) EU:C:2014:2204.
12 SIA “Maxima Latvija” v Konkurences padome (C-345/14) EU:C:2015:784.
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(see, for example, paras 925 and 1760 of Commission
Decision C(2009) 3726 of 13 May 2009 relating to a
proceeding under Article 82 [EC] and Article 54 of the
EEA Agreement, (Case COMP/C-3/37.990 — Intel)).
In its decision of 6 September 2017 in the respective
decision, the ECJ disagreed with the Commission and
with the General Court, which previously upheld the
view,13 sending an even clearer message to the European
Commission that as efficient and comfortable such a
formalistic approach could be, it is notwithstanding not
desirable. In the light of the ECJ decision in Intel, the
recent decisions whereby the European Commission
found Google guilty for abusing its dominant position
might well be a faux pas and the EU enforcer is facing
an uphill battle in defending them in front of the EU
courts. The problem is that the EC cannot afford to lose
any of the Google cases, or otherwise its reputation would
be seriously shattered. The biggest danger is that while
EU courts do not perform a full review of the merits of
a case and might not be expert in economic aspects, they
are made of judges who are much more familiar with
legal concepts such as the presumption of innocence and
at ease in finding whether or not the fundamental
substantive and procedural rights were respected. For
instance, in Cartes Bancaires the judges simply wanted
to communicate to the European Commission that even
an alleged per-se infringement requires aminimal analysis
and that the imputations made to the sanctioned
undertakings should make sense.
It remains to be seen if the European Commission will
pay due attention to what the ECJ has signalled so far.
Beyond the passing glory brought by high-profile cases
and ever-increasing fines, the European Commission
should act responsibly.
The underlying structural problem
The superficial approach to the “per-se” infringements
in the EU is fuelled and aggravated by a structural
weakness of the EU Commission and almost all of the
NCAs in the EU, which raises significant doubts as to
whether or not these agencies fully comply with the
principles of legality, independence, transparency,
effectiveness, and responsibility—LITER.14
All these agencies are designed as administrative
institutions, where the investigative and the adjudication
functions are bundled under the same roof. Unlike the
prosecutorial model, where the decision is taken by
another institution than the one having conducted the
investigation—a general or specialised court—the
administrative competition agencies are more prone to
errors due to a variety of reasons, from the confirmation
bias to the need to report meaningful results.
The prosecutorial model has more advantages over the
administrative model, from the avoidance of the
confirmation bias, thus avoiding costly false positives, to
increased transparency and credibility of the decisions
issued in such a system.15 In the case of the European
Commission, what makes things worse is that so far it
has avoided calls for introducing guarantees for properly
safeguarding the right of defence, such as organising
hearings with the undertakings, before issuing a decision.
The fact that the proceedings going to the final decision
are supervised by a hearing officer is no longer enough
to meet the requirements set in the case law of ECHR and
ECJ.
The coexistence of investigative and adjudication
branches and the need to finalise in a reasonable period
of time a growing number of cases drive the
administrative agencies into pickingmost often the lowest
hanging fruit—the “by-object” infringements, which are
preferred over effects-based infringements16—and further
on, in considering that the infringement exists, based even
on very little evidence.When the behaviour analysedmay
have a credible alternative explanation, there is a strong
tendency that the EC or an NCA would consider it to be
rather a violation, which contradicts the established case
law of the ECJ and, even worse, it breaches the
presumption of innocence and the requirements of a due
process. I was myself a Board member of one of the
NCAs in the EU and I can witness first hand that this
tendency exists, and it is not easy to be fought only with
internal safeguards. The explanation for the approach is
a mix of justified self-confidence (but “Success is a lousy
teacher. It seduces smart people in thinking they can’t
lose”, per Bill Gates) and the need to produce quickly
decisions with a public impact (i.e. “If all you have is a
hammer, everything looks like a nail”, per Abraham
Maslow). The immediate result is superficiality and
perceived arbitrary decisions. The long-term result might
be either a chilling effect on the increasingly confused
business environment or a reduced effort by the
undertakings to achieve full competition compliance,
which are both detrimental to the goals of the competition
rules.
The rebalancing
I am not the first and for sure not the last to advocate for
an upgrade of the mechanisms used to enforce the EU
competition rules in order to maintain the level of quality
of the decisions and to respect the rights of the
investigated parties, whilst preserving a robust level of
enforcement.17
13 Intel Corp v European Commission (C-413/14 P) EU:C:2017:632.
14 See Annetje Ottow, Market and Competition Authorities: Good Agency Principles (Oxford University Press, 2015), pp.45–94.
15 For more details regarding the advantages and disadvantages of the prosecutorial model see, for instance, Frederic Jenny, “The Institutional Design of Competition
Authorities: Debates and Trends” in Competition Law Enforcement in the BRICS and in Developing Countries (Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp.22–25.
16 See also Odudu, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law The Scope of Article 81 (2006), p.177.
17 See Forrester, “Due process in EC competition cases: A distinguished institution with flawed procedures” (2009) 34 E.L.R. 840–842; Montag, “The Case for a Radical
Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17” (1996) 8 E.C.L.R. 428, 430; Slater, Thomas andWaelbroeck:Competition Law Proceedings before the European
Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?, The Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series GCLC Working Paper 04/08.
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The only thing I want to do is to relaunch this debate,
at a crucial moment for the EU competition law and with
the hope that the European Commission will realise that
it needs to reflect on its proceedings and structure for the
enforcement of the EU competition rule, in order to
achieve its policy purposes and maintain its very good
record in the EU courts. Since ECHR firmly settled in
Menarini that competition law amounts to criminal law
and since the ECHR is now part of the internal order of
the EU, the courts based in Luxembourg intensified the
frequency of the signals to the EU Commission that
“something is rotten in Denmark” (no pun intended!) and
it would be advisable that the Commission considers these
signals. The per se approach to the hard-core cartel
infringements is a powerful instrument in the weaponry
of the European Commission and the national competition
authorities and it must continue to be used, for the benefit
of the EU economy and its consumers. What I argue is
that powerful weapons should always be used with
caution and nobody should pull the trigger unless this is
justified.
What is meant is that the excesses of formalism in the
enforcement of the cartel prohibition in the EU—and, by
extension, also the rigid approach to abuse of dominance
cases—should be corrected in order to ensure quality of
the decisions, trust, and accountability.
In the short run, no change of the EU Treaties, which
is a lengthy and complicated process, is required in order
to achieve a better enforcement of the EU competition
rules. A more careful analysis of the facts, going back to
basics for the interpretation of art.101 TFEU, with the
avoidance of superficial approaches and of confirmation
biases, could be enough for the time being and might
significantly improve the situation.
But in the long term, fundamental changes are
necessary in the way the EU competition enforcers, and
especially the European Commission, investigate and
take decisions in cases regarding potential infringements
of the EU competition rules, in order to fully ensure the
requirements of the due process and the quality of the
decisions. One possible solution would be to transfer the
adjudication function from the European Commission to
the European Tribunal, which will soon receive an
additional number of judges and where there is already
enough expertise in order to cope with such an attribution.
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